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PROGRESS IN VOLUNTARY TRIBUNALS
"Resolved, That while in full sympathy with the various
movements on foot throughout the country looking to a sim-
plification of our methods of court procedure and other re-
forms in the administration of justice in the regularly consti-
tuted courts of this country, we believe that an effort should
be made by members of -the bar to encourage the settlement of
private differences which give rise to civil actions before
tribunals voluntarily selected by the parties, that the prac-
tice by members of the bar of selecting fellow-members in
good standing to act as arbitrators in such causes presents a
safe, speedy, inexpensive method for the adjustment of such
differences, the principles of which have long been recognized
and encouraged by our jurisprudence, and ample provision for
which exists in our statutes on arbitration."
The writer in the Spring of 1914 appeared before the bar asso-
ciations of St. Louis and of Kansas City, and, at the annual meeting
the following September, of the State (see Published Proceedings Mo.
Bar Ass'n, 1914) in advocacy of the trial of civil suits by lawyers
before lawyers of their own choosing. The foregoing resolution was
adopted by the St. Louis and Kansas City Bar Associations at the
conclusion of the addresses made. The settlement of differences by
statutory arbitration, where the arbitrator chosen was a lawyer, was
not unknown. What the writer contended for was the recognition
and voluntary adoption by lawyers of this method of the adjudication
of private differences which gave rise to the ordinary civil actions, as
a distirct procedure-not as a mere device for avoiding the expense
and delay of the ordinary court procedure, not simply as an expedient
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for relieving our overburdened courts, but as a truly evolutionary
advance in legal procedure, a building upon and preserving all that is
permanently goocrin the past history of jurisprudence on its procedural
side. The underlying principle of the proposed procedure is that
priwte differences should be privately settled, that the State should
function in matters of public concern alone, and that so far as ovi-
state courts and their attendant machinery are concerned,
their true function is to adjudicate ,uestions in the decision
of which the community has an interest distinct from that
of the individual whose rights may be directly involved. The
writer in the addresses refererd to, after distinguishing between adjec-
tive and substantive law, attempted to trace the development of the
Iwo streams of adjective or procedural law which flowed respectively
from the conciliatory spirit of the orient, reaching its perfection in the
procedure of the Roman Law, and that which tookc its rise in the
fighting spirit of the Anglo-Saxons, from which we have our modern
trials before juries with advocates representing the contending par-
ties (contrasting the Oriental custom of sitting dharma, where the cred-
itor fasted in front of his debtor's door, until his debt was recognized
and paid, with the Anglo-Saxon procedure of wager of battle), and
showed that the proposed procedure was a coalescence of the two--the
hon-professional arbitrator or praetor of the Roman procedure becom-
ing the professional judge, and the juris consulti, who instructed their
clients as to the law of their cases, stepping into the open and becoming
the trial lawyers.
The writer was content to leave the matter here, confident that if the
procedure suggested was, as he thought, the next step forward in an
enlightened jurisprudence, a development along the lines indicated
would sooner or later be witnessed. It came sooner than he ex-
pected. The Chamber of Commerce of New York had long
had its Committee on Arbitration, as have most of the ex-
changes of the country. In its report at its 148th annual meet-
ing, held May 4. 1916. it presented a review of its work during the
preceding year. In this report it was said: "For a great many cases,
the Chamber, through its Committee, furnishes the only machinery for
satisfactory settlements. The only other available method is resort to
the courts, with its heavy toll of time, inconvenience and expense, or
possible submission grudgingly to what one party or other regards as a
piece of injustice." and expressed itself as feeling certain that the
Chamber "will cordially approve what we regard as a memorable step
forward. We refer to the co-operative movement between the New
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York State Bar Association and your own Committee on Arbitration.'
And they report that they had made the suggestion in a letter dated
October 6, 1915, to the New York State Bar Association "that, under
its auspices, the New York State Bar Association establish a system of
arbitration, whereby lawyers will act as arbitrators for the settlement
of disputes among laymen on lines analogous to those followed by our
Chamber."
In the Report of this Committee on Arbitration to the Chamber at
the meeting held May 3, 1917, it reported as follows: "One of the
most encouraging features of the past year's work is the marked recog-
nition, by the legal profession, of the value of our method of settling
controversies." And said further: "The co-operation of the legal
profession is coming in three ways: First, in the legal validation of
all contracts, by which parties agree to submit to arbitration questions
that may arise out of the contract. Second, in legislation making it
practicable to obtain, incidental to an arbitration, a court ruling on any
legal question that may arise. Third, in the appointment of lawyers as
arbitrators, thus enabling the arbitrators to pass on questions of both
law and fact." And it reported that, at the last annual meeting of the
New York State Bar Association "the plan of having an official list of
lawyer-arbitrators, with a system built upon our experience, was unan-
imously approved by that Association, and our organization and the
New York State Bar Association are now working in co-operation."
"\e think," continued the report, "'that it is true today that there is de-
veloping a wider feeling on the part of business men generally that
the honorable and manly policy to pursue in the event of a commer-
cial controversy is to endeavor to adjust it, if it can be adjusted, with-
out resort to the courts; and, even in cases where recourse to the courts
is necessary, to deal with them in a friendly spirit, not with hatred
or acrimony, but with a desire to preserve good will and sound com-
mercial relations."
In the published address before the Missouri Bar Association the
writer had used this language: "Simple, dignified, honest, conciliatory
and democratic, I submit it offers one solution of the vexed question of
procedure, so far as it applies to the determination of private differ-
ences which give rise to the ordinary civil actions which choke our
courts."
As a result of the co-operation of the Chamber of Commerce and
the New York State Bar Association, a joint Committee was appointed
which prepared and published Rules for the Prevention of Unnecessary
Litigation, which were approved by the Chamber of Commerce No-
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vember 2, 1916, and by the New York State Bar Association January
13, 1917. These Rules are of the greatest value to business men and
to lawyers and will well repay study and observance. Part I was di-
rected at the prevention of litigation at the source, i. e., to the mak-
ing oT contracts, wills and other instruments, and to the seeking advice
of counsel. Under Part II of the Rules, which part aims at the pre-
vention of litigation after the facts become fixed and before suit, the
following rule was formulated: "Rule IX. When negotiations fail
to settle a dispute, submit the question to arbitration and abide by
the decision of the arbitrators.- And several forms of arbitration, as,
one, informal; two, under the code; three, under the auspices of a com-
mercial body, or, four, under the auspices of a bar association, are
pointed out, and it is said: "Where the sole arbitrator is a lawyer, or
where the submission provides that a lawyer on the board of arbitra-
tors shall be the sole judge of the law, there is no reason why any
question of law or fact, involving property rights, should not be arbi-
trated, provided the parties interested are of full age and sound mind.
In arbitrations involving technical questions, whether in law or special
lines of business, experience has shown the advantage of selecting as
arbitrators persons in that particular line of business or otherwise fa-
miliar with the trade customs or technicalities involved." And the
announcement is made that provision has been made for arbitration
under the auspices of the New York State Bar Association, as follows:
"Following the example of commercial bodies, the New York State
Bar Association has established under its auspices a system of arbi-
tration which it deems practicable for lawyers to recommend to
clients wishing to settle their disputes by arbitration. With one or
more lawyers sitting in each case, arbitrators are enabled to pass upon
questions of law as well as questions of fact." And referring to the
rules governing arbitration the Committee in its report says: "These
rules have been prepared simply with the idea of making it easy for
opposing lawyers to submit their clients' differences to another lawyer
of their own selection whenever they and their clients shall think it best
to do so." And in the Committee's Report for 1918 it reports the com-
pilation of a list of about 1200 names of lawyers, members of the
Association, as willing to act as arbitrators, since which the classified'
list has been published as "Official Arbitrators of the New York State
Bar Association." This list contains the names and addresses of law-
yers of each of the nine Judicial Districts into which the State is
divided, both general practitioners and specialists.
In 1918 Mr. Julius Henry Cohen, who had been the advisor of
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the Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration of the Chamber of
Commerce of New York, published a scholarly work on "Commercial
Arbitration and the Law" (D. Appleton & Co.), in which the author
devotes a chapter (Chap. II) to the efforts made for the prevention ot
unnecessary litigation, and refers to the 1917 Report of the Commit-
tee of the New York State Bar Association and says: "Earlier, ana
in 1914, Percy Werner, a member of the St. Louis Bar, wrote concern-
ing the desirability of lavyers as arbitrators. . . . 'Where parties
havzig a private disagreement which they are unable to settle, resort to
lawyers who are likewise unable to bring about accord and satisfaction,
these lawyers shall elect among their fellow members of the bar a judge
before sc'hoin to try their case, follotting the statutory form for arbi-
tration. Their agreement of submission, stating the subject-matter of
the controversy, w4th, of course, sufficient certainty that it can always
be used in support of proof of res adjudicata, constitutes the only
pleading in the case. Mere matters of procedure, as to time, place and
manner of trial, are regulated by the attorneys and arbitrator, or con-
trolled by the latter, as may best suit the convenience of all con-
cerned.' " 'Mr. Cohen's book is a most interesting and valuable history
of commercial arbitration and contains a strong and convincing attack
on the rule of our courts, following a dictum of Lord Coke, in holding
that the delegation of power to an arbitrator, and thus an agreement to
arbitrate, was revocable, as well as on the holding of our courts that
parties cannot by agreement operating in the future oust the courts of
jurisdiction, and shows that our courts show a disposition to correct
these judicial errors, as he contends them to be. Of course, these de-
cisions only affect the procedure so far as they touch the right par-
ties to agree to arbitrate future differences. and to recede from arbitra-
tions prior to an award by the arbitrator. It has" uniformly been held
that an award of an arbitrator, whether the result of a common law or
of a statutory arbitration, would be enforced by the courts. But it is
to be hoped, in the interest of honesty and fair dealing, that the old rule
as to the revocability of an agreement to arbitrate will, if it be not
abandoned by our courts, be changed by appropriate legislation. Such
a bill was in fact introduced by the Committee on Arbitration (for-
merly the Committee on Prevention of Unnecessary Litigation) at the
1917 session of the New York State Legislature, but failed of passage
owAing to war conditions (see Report of Committee January, 1919).
And, in this connection, attention is drawn to a section of the chapter
on arbitration of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (Chap. VII, Sec.
868, R. S. Mo. 1909), which reads as follows:
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"Agreement To Arbitrate No Bar To Suit.-Any contract
or agreement hereafter entered into containing any clause or
provision providing for an adjustment by arbitration shall not
preclude any party or beneficiary under such contract or
agreement from instituting suit or other legal action on such
contract at any time, and the compliance with such clause or
provision shall not bc a condition precedent to the right to
bring or recover in such action."
The Missouri statute of arbitration was adopted in 1835, and con-
tinued practically unchanged since then. The section just quoted was
adopted by our legislature in 1909. It is a blot upon our statute book.
There is no reason, no sense, no excuse for it. If we could but learn
the truth about its formulation, introduction and passage, much valu-
able light might be thrown on our American legislative methods. In
view of the fact that almost all important private contracts made to-
day, including insurance contracts, railway construction contracts,
building contracts, leases, grain contracts and contracts between em-
ployers of labor and labor unions, contain provisions for arbitration,
and in view of the strong public policy which supports such agree-
ments, it is safe to say that it does not represent the public will crys-
tallized in legal enactment. Why should we render void fair and honest
efforts of parties to a contract to provide for a speedy, inexpensive
and conciliatory settlement of differences arising under their contracts
without resort to the courts or expense to the public? This section
should not only be repealed, but, to the contrary, agreements to arbi-
trate should expressly be made irrevocable after they have once been
fairly entered into.
The Missouri arbitration statute recognizes the right of a party to
revoke a submission to arbitrate at any time prior to the final submis-
sion to the arbitrators upon hearing for their decision, but provides that
the party so revoking shall be liable to an action by the adverse party
to recover all the costs, expenses and damages, including attorney fees,
in preparing for such arbitration. In the case of State ex rel. Ken-
nedy v. Merchants' Exchange (2 Mo. App. 96) it was held that a by.
law of a Merchants' Exchange, which compelled members to submit
their business controversies to arbitration, on pain of suspension or
expulsion, was unreasonable "in the legal and technical sense of that
term," and could not be sustained. The court in its opinion was careful
to state that the law was not opposed to arbitration, saying: "On the
contrary, it is said to be the policy of the law to encourage these domes-
tic tribunals, although they may, if they choose, disregard the rules
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of law in their decisions." The court recognizes it as the law of both
England and this country that the reasonableness or the unreasonable-
ness of an award does not affect its validity, so long as there be no mis-
behavior or corruption in the arbitrators, but holds that every citizen
has a right to the protection of the equal laws, "and to all the security
against irremedial injustice which the wisdom of centuries has provided
in those traditional rules or legislative enactments that govern pro.
ceedings in courts of justice," and so holds it a fatal objection to the
by-law in question that it would "compel every respectable merchant of
the city, on the pain of losing caste and being deprived of means essen-
tial to the carrying on of business on equal terms, to submit every con-
troversy arising in the course of trade to a tribunal, which is not
bound by legal rules, and which may, if it so choose, utterly disregard,
in forming its decision, every ruling of the courts and every legisla-
tive enactment." This decision was rendered by the St. Louis Court
of Appeals in 1876. In 1899 the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in the
case of Farmer vs. Board of Trade (78 Mo. App. 557) had before it
the question of the right of an exchange to expel a member for a
refusal to submit a difference to arbitration under the Constitution,
Rules and Regulations of the association. In the course of its opinion
in this case the court said: "It is well known that parties cannot, by
agreement to arbitrate future differences, oust the courts of jurisdic-
tion. But that principle of law does not affect our statement that the
association may have a rule requiring all differences between members
to be settled by arbitr tion and to impose expulsion as a penalty for dis-
obedience of :u-ch rule. . . . If parties get into the courts of the
country and one of them should set up such agreement against the
other, the court would not allow it any force, but would proceed to
apply the law without regard to the agreement. But the association
may nevertheless enforce, not the agreement to arbitrate but
the penalty for refusing. For the refusal is a violation of its rules
which the member has agreed to obey." The Kennedy case was a pro-
ceeding by mandamus to compel the Exchange to reinstate the relator
as a member. The Farmer case was an injunction proceeding to re-
strain an Exchange from suspending or expelling the plaintiff from
membership. Both cases involve the question of the validity of a by-
law requiring arbitration of differences between members. In the one,
it was held that the by-law was unreasonable and void, and in the other
it was held that, while a member could not be compelled to arbitrate his
differences, he could be expelled for violating his agreement to do so.
In other words, while the by-law could not be enforced, the penalty for
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not respecting the by-law could be enforced. I submit that this juggling
is highly discreditable to our law and results from the effort of our
courts to adhere to the early judicial errois, to which Mr. Cohen, in his
work above mentioned, refers. In the field of insurance contracts we
find it held (McNees vs. Southern Ins. Co., 61 Mo. App. 335) that,
though parties cannot oust the courts of their jurisdiction to try causes,
by providing that all matters pertaining to the cause of action shall be
submitted to arbitration, yet it is well established that the amount of
loss or damage may be so submitted; but that (White vs. Farmers'
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 97 Mo. App. 590) where there was a denial of lia-
bility in toto, then the court had jurisdiction to settle the liability, not-
withstanding an arbitration clause in a policy. It is to be hoped that
our arbitration statute may soon be brought up to date, .by validating all
agreements to arbitrate future differences, whether by by-laws of or-
ganizations or by clauses in contract, and by taking away the right of
revocation prior to a final submission. We feel quite confident that if
the bugaboo of arbitration by laymen can be disposed of by the gen-
eral adoption of arbitration by lawyers, or lawyers sitting with laymen,
every reasonable objection to such enactments would be met. There is
something inherently absurd for parties to a private controversy calling
on voters of a community indiscriminately to elect a judge to settle
their private differences, rather than selecting their own judge; and
there is something just a little worse than absurdity in the continuous
piling up in our public records the legal papers and record entries of
every petty little private dispute between citizens which requires
adjudication. PERCY WERNER.
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